redarmylivinghistory

Information originally compiled by NIMITZ1967, on the UBI-soft Silent Hunter 4 forum. It might be a little overkill information-wise, but I found it very interesting non-the-less:



Russian submarine operations in World War II are a teeth grinding example of what happens when a DEFENDING protagonist gains ascendancy enough to, for all intents and purposes, shut down operations on a wide scale. So, a thousand apologies to Russian users that hit on this one and daydream....A Silent Hunter 4 style game on this topic would be suitable for EXPERTS only, or simulation gamers that wanted an exercise in nautical and military frustration.....why? Read further......in fact, On with the Show......................

The Soviet Submarine Service in World War Two.

The Soviet navy entered World War II with the largest submarine force in the world, comprising over 168 boats. Over two thirds of that force was stationed in European waters, and most of the vessels were less than ten years old. Moreover, they consisted of modern designs heavily influenced by German assistance dating back to the early 1920s, and the salvage of a British submarine sunk in 1919.

Nonetheless, Soviet subs suffered from high noise level and poor crew training. The "Maximum Leader*" (Stalin)* had an ambitious construction program that called for 341 subs to be built between 1934 and 1943. By the time of the German invasion ,(June 22nd 1941),the USSR had 215 submarines in service and another 100 undergoing sea-trials or in various stages of construction.

This program was an impressive performance, comparable to any maritime industrial nation*, but, it was also one that had strained the fledgling Soviet shipbuilding industry to the limits. Construction was spread amongst eight shipyards, centered around five classes of submarine, ranging from small coastal units to large Kreyser(Cruiser) or "K" class boats.

Manning of these vessels also became problematic, when over two thirds of senior officers were PURGED Crack Whip . Theoretically, every submarine commander was a graduate of the Soviet Naval Academy, and had served four or five years in various position on several submarines. But the purges and the rapid growth of the force made maintaining the standards impossible. Shortcuts were , therefore, taken.

Officers were drafted out of the merchant-marine , given a quick course on submarines Surprised , then spent one tour as an executive officer. Those who "qualified" were given command. This new "process" virtually guaranteed limited experience levels, and the Soviet command attempted to compensate for it by assigning a staff "rider" to go out with the new officers (C.O.s) on their first few cruises, and periodically thereafter. They also established restrictive rules on diving and the conduct of attacks, probably in the hope of preventing a C.O. from attempting more than his crew could handle.

Combat gave the Soviets an intensive training crucible which, eventually, provided them a cadre' of experienced C.O.s by late 1944. Until that time, however, their submarine losses were far out of proportion to the results they achieved.

About a third (55 units) of the Red submarine fleet were stationed in the Baltic on 1st of September, 1939. Despite having the pick of the best subs and crews, The Baltic Submarine Fleet Force failed to execute its very first mission, the covert sinking of the Soviet tanker METALLIST to provide a propaganda justification for Moscow's attack on Poland. The submarine SHCH-303 missed, and the tanker had to be sunk instead by a Soviet torpedo boat. It was a poor beginning, and the Red submarines failed to improve at all by the start of the "Winter War" with Finland that same year.

During that war, Soviet submarines, usually operating in pairs, gave their positions away by frequent communications and managed to sink only a few small coastal craft.

The Soviets recognized their faults, but the continued expansion of the fleet precluded them doing much about it. In addition to the new construction, they acquired four subs from the Baltic countries ( when they were occupied by the Red Army in 1940). Another problem was the over-riding priority given to new construction. This meant repairs and routine maintenance on those boats already commissioned suffered.

The German invasion caught the Baltic Fleet with 69 operational subs, 34 undergoing sea trials or fitting out, and another 22 under construction. Of all those submarines, only 37 were actually combat ready, and 10 of them were on patrol.
Losses were immediate and heavy. At least 12 boats were sunk by June 29th, (invasion day + 7). Other units had to be scuttled when German ground forces approached their bases. By September, Baltic Fleet was blockaded within its bases and incomplete units had to be evacuated to the Northern and Black Sea Fleets via the Russian canal system. The Germans used the time to lay multiple minefields in the Gulf of Finland to contain what was left of the Red submarine threat.

The two other western Soviet fleets initially fared better. Their bases were out of German bomber range and there was time to evacuate most of the non-operational units before Axis ground forces approached. The Black Sea and Northern Fleets had 47 and 15 operational boats, respectively, on Jun 22 41'. Neither fleet made contact with Axis forces until mid -July, and the resulting actions were inconclusive.

Soviet losses in the Black Sea were confined to four units abandoned in the newly built Nicolayev shipyard, east of Odessa. The Northern fleet suffered no casualties at all, but it also failed to inflict any on the invaders, even after receiving six new units from the Baltic in August. the Black Sea Fleet also received several units from the Baltic by early fall. Despite this, neither of these fleets gained any important successes in 1941.

The leadership at Moscow knew Germany's naval vulnerabilities. The Germans had extensive sea lines of communications passing through all three Soviet fleet areas. In the Arctic, the poor road network forced them to transfer supplies by sea. The Germans also received 75% of their iron-ore from Sweden, and all of that came by sea-through the Baltic eight months of the year, and by way of Narvik, Norway, during the cold winter months. Army Group South received a large portion of its supply via coastal convoys emanating from the Danube River.

The Arctic offered the most open ocean, and therefore, seemingly provided the best opportunities for the Red Fleet to prey on merchant shipping, but the harsh climate limited Northern Fleet operations. Units often operated with visibility restricted; stormy weather many times shut down operations altogether. Also, only primitive support facilities existed.

Moreover, the entire North Cape area is peppered with with narrow, deep fjords that Germany effectively sealed with mines. Thus, German coastal convoys moved from protected fjord to protected fjord, which both complicated the Soviet targeting problem and limited the areas from which they could attack.

Still, the Soviets attempted to maintain a continuous presence off the main German port of Petsamo, and throughout the North Cape area. They even provided a base at Polyarny for five Royal Navy submarines. Real opportunities, though remained scarce until 1944. Even then, the Soviets inflicted light losses on the Germans, sinking only a few merchants, and damaging nothing larger than a sub-chaser.

The Baltic Fleet also had problems. Though Germany annually received almost 8 million tons of iron-ore via Baltic routes, the Soviets only access to those routes, after August 1941, was through the Gulf of Finland- and the Axis controlled both of its shores. By October, the Axis had the eastern Gulf sealed with nearly 2,000 mines. A second, more extensive anti-submarine net barrier was laid at the western mouth of the gulf between March and May of 1942. Finnish and German submarines, aircraft, fast patrol boats and ASW units patrolled the area between.

Soviet Baltic Fleet submarines had to sail a 200 nautical mile gauntlet before even reaching Germany's sea lanes. Most of their losses, occurred in that area, and the Baltic campaign was marked by extensive small unit actions around these minefields, as the Soviets tried to break through in groups. The barriers remained a severe impediment to submarine operations until Finland left the war in September 1944, when the entire network was dismantled. As a result, the Baltic Fleet enjoyed most of its submarine successes in the final period of the war.

The Black Sea Fleet faced a different set of problems. It had few targets in the first six months of the war. Once Sevastopol fell, The Axis communication lines by sea extended out to the eastern end of the Crimea. At the same time however, Sevastopol's fall also forced the Fleet to stage its ships out of the small cities of Poti and Taupse in the eastern Black Sea. Logistical facilities were also limited there, but at least there were no choke points between bases and their target areas.

Still, The Black Sea Fleet submarines had a difficult time attacking Axis shipping. Most of it consisted of small freighters and barges, which operated in shallow waters. The 50 fathom curve extended out some 35 nautical miles from the western Black Sea coast; Axis navies laid nearly 8,000 mines in the shallow zone. (THERES a bit of hard data for mines; from this we can see that mines probably don't operate below this 50 fathom mark....Nimitz.) They also concentrated their convoys into large formations protected by heavy escort groups. The relatively short transit distance between ports further limited convoy exposure to submarine attack and enabled the Germans to restrict movement to daylight hours, when they could provide aircraft support. Finally, the Germans relied on shallow draft vessels which where generally not suitable for torpedo attack, while the size of the escorts and Luftwaffe air supremacy precluded surface attacks at night.

The Luftwaffe was a powerful deterrent to submarine attacks, and remained so until the Soviets finally gained air supremacy in June 1944. But, just as in the Baltic, the Soviets lost more submarines to mines than any other single cause.

In sum, the Soviet submarine force conducted its campaigns in environments of severe logistical, personnel and operational constraints. It faced those difficulties with great determination and often proved innovative in finding solutions to its problems. Despite having lost all but two of its shipyards to over-running German forces, the Soviets went on to produce 57 new submarines during the war as well as repairing damage to more than 30 others.

Submarine production was based around five(5) basic types: the "K", "L", "SHCH", "S" and "M" classes (see table below). Refinements were added to new units and improvements made on boats entering the yards for repairs. Interestingly, the M class was built in Gorky, south east of Moscow, then transported along the inland river canal system, to either Leningrad or Severodvinsk (near Archangel) for final assembly. Units destined for the Black Sea were dispatched, again by canal, to the Sea of Azov.

Two experimental submarines were launched during the war, but only one was actually completed, the M-401; it used a closed cycle diesel for propulsion and was tested successfully in the Caspian sea, but never saw operational service. A submerged stabilizing system, to enable the sub to "hover' at a given depth, was also tested during the war and used operationally in 1944. Other improvements noted on Soviet subs during the war included better, quieter engines, better hydrophones and sonar. Despite testing a primitive snorkel device before the war, the Soviets did not pursue development of it, and waited instead until after 1945 to install a copy of the German "Snorkel" on their own units.

The Soviets also used their submarines to land agents, for intelligence collection and for mine-laying. Though the Soviet submarine force achieved only limited results during the war (see table below), their crews pressed home their attacks in the face of heavy losses and often overwhelming odds. They got better at what they did as the war progressed, and tried increasingly complex tactics involving co-operation with surface units, fast patrol craft and even aircraft. They also increasingly conducted their attacks "acoustically", relying on their sonar and hydrophones instead of periscope to target their torpedoes. Though these new tactics were generally ineffective, they cut losses and did cause the Germans much concern in the final days of the war.

Despite its problems, losses and lack of recognized success, the Soviet submarine force drew Kreigsmarine resources away from other theaters and tasks, provided, intelligence support to Red Army commanders, and facilitated that army's campaign against the German rear in the far north and along the Baltic coast. In those respects, the Soviet campaign was successful.

As a final note, the Soviet Pacific Fleet submarines saw no action during the war. The Pacific Fleet only re-established in 1935, but it had the largest submarine contingent by 1939. Five of it's units transferred to Northern Fleet in '42 '43 and returned after the war.

By the time Moscow declared war on Japan in August 1945, there were virtually no Japanese ships left to attack. Nonetheless, at least 2 Soviet subs were lost in the Pacific. One, the L-16, was mistakenly sunk by the Japanese submarine I-25 , as it cruised off the U.S. west coast en-route to North Fleet, via the Panama canal. The other was lost in either Japanese or American minefields near Hokkaido.

SOVIET SUBMARINE SUCCESSES
(#/#= no. of ships/G.R.T.)
:Year- ( (BALTIC)- (NORTH)- (BLACK S.)- (PACIFIC)-

-1939- ( 0/0) ( NA.) ( NA.) (0/0) *
-1940- ( 1/-703t.) (0/-0.) (0/-0.) (NA.)
-1941- ( 2/-4067t.) (5/-7199t.) (5/-15845t.) (NA)
-1942- (19/-40146t.) (10/-19020t.) (9/-11526t.) ( NA.)
-1943- (- ** .) (14/26169.) (15/-30168.) (NA.)
-1944- (12/-20969t.) (97/-15819.) (95/-6858t.) (NA.)
-1945- (15/-67504t.) (NA.) (NA.) (4/?t.)

-TOTALS- (48/-132686t.) (36/-68207t.) (34/-64847t.) (4/-?t.)

122 ships of 265,740 Gross Registered Tons.
* = Although Japan and the Soviet Union fought along the Chinese-Mongolian border in Sept.39, there was no naval action. Sleeping
** = Operations were suspended as a result of Finno-German effectiveness at ASW minefields in Gulf of Finland.

SOVIET SUBMARINE LOSSES

BY FLEET
BALTIC / NORTH / BLACK / PACIFIC
-:1939- 0./ -1. / -0. / -0.
-:1940- 1./ -1 ./ -0 ./ -0.
-:1941- 29./ -0./ -12./ -0.
-:1942- 16./ -10./ -11./ -1.
-:1943- 5./ -10./ -4./ -0.
-:1944- 1./ -6./ -4./ -0.
-:1945- 1./ -0./ -0./ -1.
-TOTAL- 53./ -28./ -31./ -2.

BASELINE NUMBER + CONSTRUCTION
-: Cool Units acquired from foreign source(pre'41). = 4.
-:New construction,(9/1/39 to 6/22/41). = 39.
-:New construction after (6/22/41). = 57.
-: Cool Foreign Acquisitions (1944). = 4.
-:Total additions (9/1/39) to (8/9/45). = 100.
-:Units in commission (9/1/39). = 168
-:Total commissioned during war. = 268.

DELETIONS
-Decommissioned (9/1/39 to 6/22/41). = 4.
Total war losses. = 114.
-:Units in commission (8/9/45). = 154.
-:% lost to combat/accident. = 41%.
Of the nations participating in World War II, only Germany suffered a higher loss rate for its submarine force.

SOVIET SUBMARINE ORDER OF BATTLE BY FLEET
BALTIC 1 SEPT '39 / 22Jun'41
-A class- 0./ -0.
-B class- 5./ -1.
-D class- 3./ 1.
-K class - 1(+10)./ -4(+5).
-L class- 3(+3)./ -3(+3).
-M class- 16(+7)./ -21(+23).
-P class- 3 ./ -3.

:SHCH class- 17(+11)./ -20(+13).
:Foreign built- 1./ -5
:Tenders- 4./ -4.

:Salvage Ships- 1./ -1.

BLACK SEA
-A class- 5./ - 5.
-D class- 3./ -3.
-L class- 1(+3)./ -3(+3).
-M class- 6(+13)./ 14.
-S class- 0(+5)./ -4(+2).
-SHCH class- 8(+6)./ -15(+3).
-Tenders- 2./ -2.

NORTHERN FLEET
-D class- 1./ -1.
-K class- 2./ -2.
-M class- -6./ 6(+3).
-SHCH class- 5./ -6.
-Tenders- 1./ -1.

PACIFIC FLEET
-L class- 6(+7)./ -13.
-M class- 37./ -37.
-S class- 0(+6)./ -2(+4).
-SHCH class- 33(+3)./ -35(+3).
-Tenders - 2./ -3.

-:Notes-Numbers in brackets indicate the number of subs under construction, fitting out or in sea trials within a fleet area. Construction totals in the table Wazzup don't match those in the text because many M class units were built in Gorky/Sverdlovsk shipyards and thus not located in any fleet area. Shipyards in north Fleet area were newly complete in late 1940 and could only be used for final assembly.
Foreign subs included one British and four Baltic countries boats. The British submarine L-55 was sunk by a Soviet destroyer in 1919 then recovered by the Reds in 1928, refurbished and recommissioned in 1932. The Soviets also seized 2 subs each from Estonia and Latvia when they occupied those countries in August 1940.


This article appeared in a "magazine with a game in it", the original Strategy and Tactics magazine (issue no.19 Nov-Dec 1996). I think S&T is still in print. it was written by their resident submarine contributor, Carl O. Shuster, who had contributed other articles on submarines in the past. S&T was what you guys would probably now call a "rivet counters magazine", and had a very dry, hard data style to its pieces, rather than the authoritive warmth of the pages of "The General"

An interesting yet dismal account of Red Fleet submarines which misses out on one point (presumably in yet another piece of Cold War derived writing)

Alexander Ivanovich Marinesko, Captain of the S-13 of the Baltic Fleet was the highest scoring Allied submarine commander of WW2.

The submarine museum in St.Petersburg is named after him and he was awarded a Hero of Soviet Union postumously in 1990.

Ade, please transfer this fantastic thread to Red Navy, it needs the bandwidth more than History!

Very interesting thread.

Now moved here as per Rob's request.

I'd like also to draw your attention to Hero of the Soviet Union Captain Fisanovich of M-172 of the Northern Fleet.

Breaking through a powerful 5 ship German escort he successfully sank an enemy troop transport of 6000 tons and then submerged and took evasive action against the escorts. In the next six minutes the enemy dropped 32 depth charges on the M-172 which knocked out most of its controls, including the rudder and plunged it into darkness. Calmly Fisanovich went around the boat reassuring his men and supervising the repair teams.

The enemy kept up the attack for TEN HOURS during which they dropped 324 (!!) depth charges on the M-172.

Finally the M-172 was repaired suffuciently to be able to surface and engaged the enemy with her deck gun whilst receiving yet more fire from the enemy's escort ships and air attack with both guns and bombs.

Finally she managed to withdraw under cover of Soviet coastal artillery.

If you are interested in the Red Fleet's war, I highly reccommend the book "With the Red Fleet" - the war memoirs of Admiral Arseni Golovko. Its in English

That was absolutely fascinating; I never realised what a heritage the Cold War submarine force had.
Thanks for taking time to bring it to us.

I wouldnt say that overall they had a terribly effective war - nothing compared to fascist U-boats or the devastation the USN caused in the Pacific, but on the other hand it is a story of incredible bravery against heavy odds and as such is a tale worth recounting.

Breaking into an enemy convoy lane through minefields in shallow waters takes very brave men indeed.

But surfacing and engaging enemy ASW-escorts with a deckgun like Captain Fisanovich and his crew....now that's....progressive.
And being able to tell the tale afterwards.

awsome
always wanted to know about soviet subs!

so thats what ever you were talking about for you