redarmylivinghistory

Comrades, is this a correct description of the purely defensive 1980s deep-strike battle plan, or has my understanding been tainted by Imperialist propaganda?

"Deep strike" was a doctrine, devised by the Soviets and can be seen in almost every facet of their military. It basically entailed getting to the atlantic ocean as quickly as possible, in the event of NATO declaring war and invading them first, of course. For this purpose, there was no area of the military that was not mechanised, no light infantry, all logistics were designed to be fast-moving, even their air assault forces had their own air-droppable APCs.

In terms of tank warfare, the role of tank units were to move fast and to outflank and encircle enemy formations. Once these formations were surrounded, they would suffer an enormous air and artillary bombardment (possibly with the use of chemical, biological or tactical nuclear weapons, if it was deemed necessary) followed by a massed mechanised infantry and tank attack. The role of the infantry would be to protect tanks from entrenched infantry positions, and for that purpose, they would dismount, wipe out enemy forces, mount back into their sealed APCs, and move on quickly. Tanks were to take out fortified bunkers and other positions, as it was assumed that the majority of NATO tanks would have been destroyed in the previous (heavy, to the extreme) artillary attack.

While this was going on in some parts of the advancing front line, other tank divisions and armies would be penetrating behind the enemy line to mess with logistics and communication, as well as to better fascilitate encirclement. In this role, as in the combined assault previousley mentioned, Soviet tanks were more expected to face trucks, bunkers and infantry positions, with the possibility of light armoured vehicals, not masses of NATO MBTs. For this pupose, Soviet built tanks are usually lighter in armour weight (but made better use of sloping armour, so had far stronger armour for their weight class) had a low sillouette, were faster than most NATO tanks and carried much more HE and dual-purpose HEAT than dedicated anti-tank shells. It is because of the Soviet's desire to increase armour effectiveness without a great increase in weight (and subsequent loss to mobility) that Soviet tanks made a far greater use and retro-fitting of Explosive Reactive Armour, which was relatively light. The downside was that Soviet tanks worked alot more in combined operations than western forces, and ERA is often dangerous to surrounding exposed infantry, but this was of little concern because of the fact that infantry would be inside the armoured BMP APC for most of the time.


Sorry if you got bored half-way through, but just to give you an idea of why it didn't really matter to the USSR as to who was better in tank-on tank battles. Plus the fact that the USSR had far far more tanks than NATO in active use, so sheer number of armour should win out in any unforeseen tank battle.

Note: I would be delighted to be corrected or proven wrong with a given source, please check over what I have said if any of it sounds misguided.

My background is technical but I taught NBC defence as well,plus recognition; so I have a mixed knowledge.

All of what you say is true but it might help to temper it with what we as the "enemy" percieved the Soviets would do between 1973 and 1985.

The Russians were expected to come when we were all on public holiday and our units would be manned to lowest levels; however we would have hoped that Int (not "Intel" thats American!) would detect any unusual activity on the other side of the border and therefore warn us of any "build ups".
To assist in this there were two teams : one in East Germany called "Brixmis" and the other in West Germany called "Soxmis" (Soviet Military Mission).
Each team was there to keep an eye out for any suspicious activity by the "other side".
To this extent SOXMIS (based in Herford) would shadow units on exercise and monitor numbers etc.
The British were issued with SOXMIS cards which gave a number to call if a SOXMIS vehicle (usually an Opel) was seen.
SOXMIS and BRIXMIS both got on well from what I heard.
Had the "baloon gone up" it was likely that the first thing that would happen was the activation of "sleepers" which were civilians we worked with from day to day in the military camps,or ordinary civilians who would ,when the call came, sabotage equipment (cut some wires,put sugar in a petrol tank) in simple but very effective ways.
This would slow down our reaction time.

In the rear it must be remembered that the whole ORBAT (Order of battle) relied on a supply of manpower from the rear to replace losses and these would be shipped in to the ports in Holland or Belgium or flown in to the Airheads.
Without these battle-replacements the opposition by us would die out.

So the air-, sea- and rail-heads would be targeted for persistent chemical agents (Blister or V type nerve).

This would slow down the whole process of resupply.
Meanwhile Spetsnaz would drop in the rear and attack the supply routes (like you see in Iraq) and the supply bases.

Biological weapons were unlikely because they are unpredictable and not very effective (except for poisoning etc).

Nuclear was more likely to be used by us to stop the attack !

Other options were that they would hit everything with nuclear then chemical before the attack.

Bearing in mind that the Katyusha puts down "H" agen which is Hydrogen Cyanide.

They fire a line of six BM21s and the resulting cloud of Cyanide laingers for about five minutes on the target before dissipating naturally (so no decontamination is needed).

Anyone breathing it in will suffocate (it stops Haemoglobin in blood from taking on oxygen, just like fags or carbon monoxide do) .

The BM21 attack would be the pre-cursor to an infantry ground attack and the ground taken would be clear when they arrived.

Any nucs used in the attack would be "tactical nucs" of the "Nominal Bomb" yield of 20 Kt . The same as used on Japan.
In the same way they would be burst above ground so the fireball would not touch the surface and the "airburst" would produce and enhanced (ie double) blast wave.
Fallout afterwards would be minimal but damage would be enhanced by the double and therefore more powerful blast effects.
Simply: one nuc would do as much damage or more than tons of HE from conventional artillery.

On the ground the Russian forces were geared to ignore and overcome any obstacle (river,night etc) so their NBC Recce teams were equipped fro fats movement,locating and marking then moving swiftely on.
Behind them the tanks and infantry woul maintain the momentum of the attack : bypassing strongpoints (then mopping up later) and or outflanking in the calssic manner.
The key element of Soviet tactics was applied and maintained force in the correct place and with momentum.
To achieve this they would probe for weakness and exploit it , then pile the reserves in behind the breakthrough to maintain the inertia.
Our job would have been to slow them down !!

Please excuse the typos in my last .

In the meantime the politicians were expected to "Sue for peace " and negotiate how much of the land the Soviets would "liberate" !

We meanwhile were expected to last up to ,but probably less than, two weeks.
If the TA did not get through that would be reduced !!

Meanwhile all the supplieswere coming from Antwerp etc which is a 5 to 7 hour drive in a car !

Speaking of the exercises, build-up and so on: it is normal for an army to exercise in areas that it may have to defend ,this happens year in and year out.
However, prior to conflict, forces will often be deployed "on exercise" (or Maneuvres if you are American)so that they are ready to move into the attack.
That is the satage that the MilitaryMission" would be watching.

The golden rule of Recconaisance; whether it be by sattelite or on patrol in Northern Ireland or Iraq, is to get to know what is normal in your area of operation. Know the people and the routine.
Then , if it changes ,you will notice.

My pet hate on films is "Ok Lets Do It ". Survival depends upon days,or months of watcjhing and learning ; then you can operate at minimum risk to yourself.
The common Holywood expression of " OK ! Lets Do IT" equates with .. "follow me suckers "!!

Cheers Rob!
Just out of curiosity, what measures did NATO take against the Soviet tactics, to "slow them down"? Were there any specific fortified lines of defence in Europe, or was mobility the preffered response?

Hi ,
yes there would have been a sequence ("Defence in Depth") of "prepared demolitions".
I am not privy to all but some may have been nuclear (read the book "Chieftains").
There are lots of "Talbrüсken" (large bridges which span valleys) and they would have been blown.
"Killing zones" would have been formed where natural features (bottlenecks in valleys etc) forced troop movement into confined area.
The techniques are common to all soldiering and not special to the Soviets , or anyone else.
There are "The principles of War" which you may know of : eg Surprise, Mainenance of aim, deception and so on.
Basically we would seek to canalise the enemy, slow him doan and destroy hi,
He would seek to leapfrog our defences and attack from behind,or outflank.
If you review history: Hannibal came over the mountains which was the hardest and least likely route of attack. Then the Japs came through the jungle and attacked Singapore from behind! All the guns were facing the sea !
War depends upon basic and unchanging tenets but is at the same time dynamic.
That is why it relies on people with vision and leadership ,like Erwin Rommel, Guderian, Hannibal and Ray.

One of the worst features is that forces /politicians/countries seem to relearn and forget over and over again. After conflict the forces are disbanded and memories forgotten and shunned. Then when the next one comes they have to begin from scratch.

... and I won`t even mention walking the streets of the Bogside with an SLR and 20 rounds.... subject to politics...

You could only cock your weapon if you felt genuinely threatened ..(that would be down to individual judgement or the section-commander)....and if you saw somebody with a weapon you had to shout " Halt hands up...halt hands up.... halt hands up" then "Stand still (at this point you can cock your weapon) I am ready to fire " (see "The Yellow Card " rules of engagement.

Up until that point you were wlking about with an uncocked weapon., so the opposition would get the first rounds off before you could defend yourself.
f you shot somebody without giving the ritual warning you could go to prison.
We used to call ourselves "figure elevens". .....a "figure twelve" is a head and shoulders target on the range ! Fig 11 is full body ; the "Hun target.

If you go into the politics and practice of Vietnam it gets more complex still.

I will be glad when we get the guys out of Iraq. My corps (REME) lost another in Afghanistan this week, He was 25 and an armourer.

Not one of them would trade what they do, or the price they may pay for anything though; that is the bit which I find difficult to explain and that is why sometimes I may seem to take what I do in living history seriously.

But I know that we all take it seriously.

How do you rate Hacketts(ok,it may have been Hicks,one of the Arnhem scrappers...) book Third world war,written in the 80s,long time since I read it but the above posts have sparked memories.
2nd part,any credence to the USSR invading North America via Alaska / Northern Canada?

Actually I am just re-reading Hacketts second volume of "the third world war".

It's interesting in places, but very wrong in others and extremely reactionary

The usual problem with all such works when looked at in retrospect, is that in pretty much every respect they try to "compare apples with oranges".

Firstly they usually have data of the very latest Western equipment and then assume the Soviets et al have stuff from the 1960's.

Secondly they poo-poo Soviet tactics and say they are stupid and don't work.

I must admit that I have no idea of any other plans the Russians had elsewhere.
Dad always said that it was the Chinese who were the true threat, as they expanded and gained technological expertise and means of production.

I have a different view of the Soviet soldier and his capabilities now that I am a civilian and am lucky to have all the freedom of information since the wall came down. My experience as a living-history group member has added to and qualified a lot of what I learned in the 80s and 90s.
So I would teach it differently now. The soviet soldier and his equipment was always respected; but now I respect it differently!

One thing I see repeated often (in armies and politicians in general) is a lack of understanding that everything exists to support the infantryman and that it is the infantry who denies the ground to the enemy.

Air power has become woven into and vital to achieving that objective but as we have seen in Bosnia ,and to a certain extent in some sandy locations it is not enough.History has forgotten that technology is only part of the battle and basic skills and tactics remain key to getting it right.

You have to get troops on the ground and keep them there.
This is a fundemental that I feel the Soviets achieved well in WW2.

The yank policy in Vietnam made the mistake of going out and patrolling then returning to large bases ,using a "body count" as a measure of their effectiveness.
In reality the VC controlled the ground because as soon as the patrol left an area they moved into it again!
Air power was not effective because they simply went underground !
Can anyone think of a hot place where some soldiers are doing something similar today ? !!!

Finally looking at the ROE (rules of engagement) soldiering can be strapped by that alone! One american pilot in Vietnam flew a regular route to a regular target,(they had to) and watched a SAM site being built below. They were not allowed to engage it due to Washingtons ROE. Eventually,after a few days, it was completed and operational and one day it shot him down !!

Don't imagine the air power thing is just a NATO one... Warsaw Pact airpower was something like numerically 3 or 4 times the size of NATO's offerings...

Basically replicating what was seen on the ground...

In a nutshell, NATO could have done nothing to prevent a lightning assault on Western Europe... except go nuclear.

The Soviet view on how to prevent this happening was to have a limited objective - the Rhine stop line. They would achieve this and negotiate a ceasefire before NATO could politically agree on the use of nuclear weapons. Once the Soviets sat in West Germany their menacing influence would probably cause the political collapse of most nations around it (take a look at where Germany sits on a map...)

On the other side, the US deployed nuclear weapons to European nations, particularly intermediate range weapons, which could be used against warsaw pact targets in Eastern Europe in the hope that by the fact that the missiles eminated from Europe, the Soviets would only retaliate against european targets... and not blow USA into atoms...

I was one of the Intel guys. I have to tell you that we had no chance. Seen the movie Dunkirk? My hope was to be one of the guys fished out of the sea onto a boat back to Blighty.

If you look at the policies in Europe :
NATO began with the "Tripwire" policy where if the Soviets came across the border we all went nuclear; but then we changed to "Flexible Response" where if they swore we swore back and if they threw rocks so did we ans so on upwards .

Ufortunatey for the soviets ; during the "Tripwire" period they designed things like BMP 1 ,which was specifically designed to carry troops in a post-nuclear battlefield.

Unfortunaltely when the policy changed to Flexi Response the BMP was no longer so appropriate and the soviets would have had to prepare the battlefield with artillery to make things even.

I concur with the observation of the US staying safe. I always felt that Europe would be that battl;efield while the Yanks sat back safe and sound.
But then you have to look at the top of the US , at Alaska and so on and think what would have gone on there.

I think it is important to remember when talking about nuclear weapons that most if not all tactical nuclear weapons would be airburst not surface burst (though Soviet fuses had a reputation for innacuracy apparently).
The airbusrt gives a double (" enhanced") blast-wave, but very little fallout because the fireball does not touch the ground.

A nominal bomb would be 20KT (which is the equivalent of 20,000 t of TNT) and airburst at 2000ft like the one at hiroshima.
Moderm weapons would have been "cleaner" that the hiroshima bomb and therefore leave less fallout.

Its important to remember that the greatest radiation ("Immediate Radiation") comes in the initial flash and fireball.

The blast follows coming at about 300kts and the shock goes through the ground.
Remember if it is an airburst there is very little shock but loads of blast.

Incidentally those of you at Ft Nelson may remember the 8" Howitzer with all the wheels parked where we formed up for the display?
That was nuclear-capable.

It later became the M110 when it was mounted on atracked chassis.
The wheeled one is the one you sometimes see in the films where they fire a shell into the Nevada desert and all the guys watch with goggles on as the fireball and mushroom cloud rises?

There is a good film of the tests (called "Doom Town" or similar )where you see a house with a telegraph ;line outside.
You see the flash of the explosion (with its accompanying heat and immediate radiation) and the telegraph line and pole show a puff of smoke. Then the blast arrives a few seconds latrer and the wooden house exits stage right !
Finally the low pressure created by the outgoing explosion is refilled by the atmoshere around it, and the dust blows back in again (drag back) towards the area of the detonation.

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid ... com+atomic

This is the gun in action and it shows graphically (because the repeat the picture with different materials, eg the tent) how the heat and flash go together then the blast catches up).

The thin streams of smoke going up before and next to the explosion are "calibration" rockets used to show the pattern of the blast around the explosion.They are not caused by the explosion.
These explosions are all very low altitude or surface and hence due to it being desert there is a prominent cloud. If viewed from above you could see a "doughnut" shaped fireball and the low pressuer creatyed sucks up a column of dust which passes through the middle.
If the same were done in Northeren Europe that would not happen due to the foliage and soild characteristics.

Bobhr wrote:To assist in this there were two teams : one in East Germany called "Brixmis" and the other in West Germany called "Soxmis" (Soviet Military Mission).

Sorry to be a pedant, Bob, but there were actually three in East Germany;
BRIXMIS, made up of British Personnel, FMLM, French, and USMLM, obviously US. The whole story of these three amazing missions can be found in 'Brixmis' by Tony Geraghty, which I would reccomend to anyone as a totally entertaining history.
It also suggests a 'private battle' type scenario with our NVA genossen...

Thanks Rob,
I never had any dealings with the other two so was not aware of their existence.
We didn`t see much of the French at all really.

"Czang" wrote:How do you rate Hacketts(ok,it may have been Hicks,one of the Arnhem scrappers...) book Third world war,written in the 80s,long time since I read it but the above posts have sparked memories.
2nd part,any credence to the USSR invading North America via Alaska / Northern Canada?

I think I would agree with Andy on that one. It's well written claptrap, much like the book that inspired it, 'The Battle of Dorking' (1871). The problem with Hackett's book is it anticipates the Soviets doing everything they can to make NATO tactics work - 'Riding at the thickest part of the hedge'.
A far better book, with less obliging Soviets, is 'Red Army' by Ralph Peters, which I'm sure our Warsaw Pact comrades have read. It shows the Soviets in a sympathetic light, the perfect antidote to Tom Clancy. It even has a kindly Zampolit!

I find the Hackett book rather irritating too; he had a whole Soviet Army mutiny, as well as, as Rob says, having the Warsaw Pact play dumb and go head-on at the strongest parts of NATO defences. What I used to call 'Soviet Space Invaders' - something found a lot in our computer models. Tres self-delusional. They were not dumb.

Clancy also has the 'good' guys always win in the end, whatever convincing scenario he's built up to make their defeat almost inevitable. Last minute 'maracles' or brainless behaviour by the the enemy to get you out of a credible situtaion you don't think the publisher will like, is so purile. He had a plot mechanism in Red Storm rising where a Spetnaz team are discovered just before the Warsaw Pact attacks and, hey presto, the dastardly enemy intentions are discovered and a wonderfully effective pre-emptive strike launched which screws up their attack plans. Yeah, right......


'Red Army' by Ralph Peters is so much more convincing, although even he had to have the Americans do wonderfully but be let down by their NATO partners.

Sadly, the same attitude prevailed amongst the policy makers we did our military studies for. They knew that, given the prepondernace of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces at the time, and given our own abysmal lack of capability and lack of political will, it was always going to be a question and 'when', not 'if' we fouind oursleves paddling in the Channel.

I'm afraid that I disagree with the idea that NATO would use tactical nuclear weapons to redress the balance. At least after, say, the mid 1960s, it would have been too risky to use TNWs and have them hit operational bases in, say, the UK and France. And no US administration was going to risk it 'getting out of hand' and sacrifice millions of American dead and a wrecked economy to save 'pinko' Europeans. Sorry guys but when the chips were down, I reckon the US would have walked to another gaming table.

Thankfully it was only ever wargamed, and not tried out!

The "nuclear question" was obviously the main key to NATO defence on both sides of the Atlantic. At no point could it become apparent that the political will was lacking - because on the other side of the Iron Curtain the will was certainly there and not a shadow of doubt at any time!

The question that always fascinates me from the whole era was just quite how any of us survived it?

What with Soviet paranoia vs NATO pushing for technical dominance, I have no idea how someone in Moscow didn't decide it was strike now before defence became impossible.

And thats how most of the scenarios seem to pan out, NATO pushes just a little too far and gets just slightly too well equipped or in some other strategic position and kaboom, a pre-emptive strike comes over the border.

Many, many documents refer to the obcession in Moscow that there shall never be another Barbarossa - something which I am sure many of us on here can clearly understand. The view being that if anyone attempted such a thing then they will be 100% completely and utterly destroyed at pretty much any cost. Whilst the West obviously had a fair amount of experience of aggression in WW2, it obviously was nothing like the Soviet one...

It may be important to remember that, in the event of any conflict with NATO in Europe, the Chinese would almost certainly jump on the bandwagon with NATO (particularly after the 68/69 boarder conflicts and the talks with Nixon in the 70s). This would certainly sap numbers for the European offensive and may have made any chance of an American homeland front impossible, the Soviet ground forces would simply have been overstretched.

That's not to say that the long range frontal aviation wouldn't have had a go at American ports or military bases on the Pacific coast, and the Naval infantry, ground forces and VDV may even have taken a swing at Japan and Hawaii to cut down the sizeable American Marine and Naval garissons there.

(With all these fronts and potential enemies, it's easy to see why Soviet society needed to be so militaristic and conscription was absolutely necessary!)

what were the border conflicts?